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Using international criminal law as a case study, this article aims to demonstrate how 
computer-assisted corpus linguistics combined with philosophy of law and sociology of 
science can help improve our understanding of legal knowledge and science. The article 
is built on a computer-driven corpus linguistic study of all judgements from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) from 1996 to 2017. To our 
surprise, this study revealed that the frequency of the use of 'ifs' in all judgements had 
exhibited an almost perfectly steady annual decline – from 93 per 100,000 words on 
average in 1996 to 34 in 2017. As a linguistic phenomenon, this contradicts how we 
would expect language to behave. In the search for an explanation, we move from 
linguistics into the philosophical and sociological study of (legal) knowledge and 
science. In the most general terms, the explanation links the disappearing of 'ifs' to the 
emergence of international criminal law as a distinct specialized legal science, a 
separate sub-discipline constituted by a professionally shared corpus of knowledge – or 
of 'a substantial body of jurisprudence on genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
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crimes, as well as forms of individual and superior responsibility', as the ICTR put it 
upon its closure. 
Keywords: international criminal law, corpus linguistics, epistemology, legal 
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With its sister international tribunals and courts, the ICTR has played a 
pioneering role in the establishment of a credible international criminal 
justice system, producing a substantial body of jurisprudence on genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, as well as forms of individual and 
superior responsibility. 
The ICTR Remembers website1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper begins with a mystery. Or at least with a surprising finding. A few 
years ago, a computer-assisted pilot study of judgements from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) revealed 
an unexpected fact about the Tribunal's use of language.2 To our surprise, we 
noticed that at the time the ICTY's Trial Chamber had used the 
commonplace word if with a statistically significant lower frequency in the 
latter half of its existence as compared to its earlier years. Comparing 
judgements from 1996 to 2003 with judgements from 2004 to 2013 revealed 
that the tribunal had almost halved its use of if, from 86 to 45 ifs per 100,000 
words. This development was thrown into sharper relief in a more recent 
follow-up study which not only brought the corpus up to date but also 
expanded it to include judgements from both the ICTY's Trial and Appeals 
Chambers, as well as all judgements from the ICTY's sister tribunal, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). A fine-graining of the 
comparison revealed that the frequency of the use of ifs across both tribunals 
had exhibited an almost perfectly steady annual decline from 93 ifs per 
100,000 words on average in 1996 to 34 on average in 2017. 
The question is why the two tribunals would use language in this way. At first 
glance, it might be tempting to simply dismiss this finding as a freak 
occurrence or, at best, a trivial puzzle. But this would be a mistake. Bearing in 
                                                 
1 'The ICTR Remembers: 20th Anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide' 
<http://www.irmct.org/specials/ictr-remembers/index.html?q=ictr-
remembers/index.html> accessed 8 November 2018. 
2 This study was carried out in 2014 by Anne Lise Kjær as an integrated part of a larger 
corpus linguistic research project on international courts. 
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mind that language use is not merely an epiphenomenon but should be taken 
seriously in its own right, this steep and steady decline of ifs is a worthy object 
of inquiry. As a piece of linguistic behavior, this phenomenon contradicts 
how we would expect language to behave. There is simply no immediately 
plausible reason why all the different panels deciding all the different cases 
brought before the ICTY and the ICTR would collectively choose, as it were, 
to reduce their use of that particular conjunction by a margin of nearly two 
thirds. The fact that they did therefore requires explanation, which this 
contribution attempts to provide. 
As we shall see, this is an explanation that takes us from linguistics into the 
philosophical and sociological study of (legal) knowledge and science, 
contributing to both these fields in interesting ways. In the most general 
terms, our explanation links the disappearance of ifs to the emergence of 
international criminal law as a distinct specialized legal science, a separate 
sub-discipline constituted by a professionally shared corpus of knowledge – 
or, as the ICTR would express it shortly before its closure, of a 'substantial 
body of jurisprudence on genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, as 
well as forms of individual and superior responsibility'.3 
In slightly greater detail, our explanation is twofold. First, reflection on the 
principles which pragmatics tells us govern cooperative discourse takes us 
from linguistics to the philosophy of law. Here, mainstream legal 
philosophers like Hans Kelsen, Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin have, each 
in their own way, defended what we call the generic philosophical view of legal 
knowledge. In spite of their theoretical differences, Kelsen, Raz, and Dworkin 
agree on a generic level that legal knowledge and science is philosophically 
presuppositional in nature. Legal scientific statements about valid law always 
implicitly or tacitly presuppose the validity of a set of philosophical or theoretical 
premises on the basis of which the validity of such statements is derived. We 
argue that a large part of these implicit premises can be reconstructed as 
conditionals, in which if works as a logical connective (if …, then …). This is 
particularly interesting when we take into account the wider context of the 
operation of the ICTY and ICTR and especially the fact that international 
criminal law was virtually nonexistent as a discipline in the mid-1990s, when 
                                                 
3 Cf. n 1 above. 
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the tribunals were established.4 In this light, we argue that the disappearing 
ifs testifies to the gradual coming into being of international criminal law as a 
specialized kind of legal knowledge and expertise with its own distinct set of 
tacit philosophical premises constituting the field's 'substantial body of 
jurisprudence'. At the same time, however, the data seem to point to 
something beyond the strong internal epistemological focus on the ultimate 
justifiability of legal knowledge which is characteristic of the generic 
philosophical approach. The aforementioned patterns in the use of ifs seem 
also to suggest the gradual emergence of an epistemic community in 
international criminal law as an empirical institutional fact. The steady decline 
in the use of ifs testifies to the emergence of a new international criminal law 
field occupied by an increasingly specialized profession whose members 
gradually become masters and practitioners of this emerging sub-discipline. 
This framework gradually allows more conditionals to be tacitly presupposed 
through technical terminology within expert discourse. This process 
simultaneously creates new disciplinary boundaries and increasingly seals off 
the point of view of international criminal law from laypeople and even from 
other lawyers. 
In order to better understand these dynamics, it therefore seems preferable 
to take a more external perspective, drawing on the sociology of knowledge 
and of science, rather than an a priori philosophical approach. Here we turn, 
in particular, to the theories of Thomas Kuhn and Pierre Bourdieu, who have 
developed certain conceptual tools that are helpful to understand the 
emergence of the kind of epistemic practice and community that we see in 
international criminal law. At the same time, however, the theories of these 
two prominent sociologists can at least be said to invite relativistic and 
ultimately quite strongly irrationalist readings that appear to be at odds with 
those found in the philosophy of law. It is therefore also necessary to consider 
the possible impact of our findings in this context. As we shall see, there is 
reason to believe that the study of ifs can at least have the effect of 
moderating and nuancing some of the more relativistic claims of these 
influential sociological critiques of legal philosophy. 
                                                 
4 The ICTY was established by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 
827 (25 May 1993). The ICTR was established by UNSC Resolution 955 (8 November 
1994). 
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We submit that this combination of philosophical and socio-epistemic 
notions provides the first building blocks for an overall framework that allows 
for a theoretical explanation of the fact that the tribunals' use of ifs has been 
changing instead of remaining constant. In order to substantiate this claim, 
we shall proceed as follows. In section 2, we recapitulate the initial findings, 
requiring a brief introduction to the basics of corpus linguistics. In section 3, 
we present the generic philosophical view of legal knowledge. In section 4, 
we illustrate the general connection between this view and the ifs through a 
case study of the ICTY's decision on jurisdiction in the Tadić case. In section 
5, we further refine and expand our empirical analysis to include a diachronic 
study of the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR. In section 6, we turn to the 
sociology of knowledge and science both to better understand the 
disappearing ifs and to criticize and nuance these sociological approaches 
themselves. In section 7, we summarize our findings and indicate promising 
avenues for further research. 
II. THE INITIAL FINDING: APPLYING COMPUTER-ASSISTED CORPUS 
LINGUISTICS TO THE ICTY CASE LAW 
1. What is corpus linguistics, and how did we apply it in the pilot study? 
As a first step, it is necessary to say a few words about our original findings, 
which in turn requires a few words more generally about computer-assisted 
corpus linguistics, through which these findings were made. In corpus 
linguistics, a corpus is usually defined as '[a] set of machine-readable texts 
which is deemed an appropriate basis on which to study a specific set of 
research questions. The set of texts […] is usually of a size which defies 
analysis by hand and eye alone within any reasonable timeframe'.5 Computers 
are capable of processing much larger amounts of text and also of 'reading' all 
these texts in a non-linear way. By submitting large numbers of digitally 
searchable texts to automated computer analysis, it is therefore possible to 
make language patterns visible, which no amount of manual analysis would 
                                                 
5 Tony McEnery and Andrew Hardie, Corpus Linguistics: Method, Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 1-2. 
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discover if one were to read the collection of texts as individual, coherent 
texts.6 
In corpus linguistic analysis, it is furthermore customary to distinguish 
between corpus-driven and corpus-based analyses.7 Corpus-driven analysis is 
conducted 'blindly', so to speak, and from the bottom-up. A text corpus is fed 
to the computer more or less without preconceptions or hypotheses and the 
digital processing then allows the researcher to open up the corpus by 
revealing conspicuous linguistic patterns that the researcher may not have 
expected and may not have searched for. Corpus-based analysis, by contrast, 
starts with more substantive preconceived notions about what to look for in 
the corpus, and then uses the computer to check systematically for particular 
patterns. While this distinction is clear in principle, the two approaches will 
often mix in research practice, as the findings of corpus-driven analysis tend 
to give rise to the formation of hypotheses that subsequently require testing 
in a more targeted corpus-based analysis.8 
Our study has followed this pattern in so far that it started as a corpus-driven 
analysis and subsequently switched to a corpus-based approach. More 
specifically, our study started out as a broad so-called corpus-driven keyword 
analysis. In corpus linguistics, keywords are words which occur with 'unusual 
frequency' in a given corpus, i.e. which are statistically significantly over- or 
underused in the text corpus in question.9 This does not mean high frequency 
in absolute numbers but high relative frequency, i.e. compared to the 
frequency of the same words in another corpus. 
                                                 
6 Michael Stubbs, 'On Texts, Corpora, and Models of Language' in Michael Hoey et al. 
(eds), Texts, Discourse and Corpora (Continuum 2007) 130-131. 
7 The distinction between the two approaches was introduced by Elena Tognini-
Bonelli, Corpus Linguistics at Work (John Benjamins 1997). 
8 For a discussion of the two approaches and their interplay, see McEnery and Hardie 
(n 5) 5-6. See also Amanda Potts and Anne Lise Kjær, 'Constructing Achievement in 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: a Corpus-Based 
Critical Discourse Analysis' (2016) 29(3) International Journal for the Semiotics of 
Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 525. 
9 Mike Scott, 'PC Analysis of Key Words – and Key Key Words' (1997) 25(2) System 
233, at 236. 
56 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
In our case, the initial corpus-driven keyword analysis was conducted as a 
pilot study only on the case law of the ICTY, i.e. of the 71 trial judgements 
delivered in the period from 1996 to 2013. This corpus was divided into two 
corpora consisting of the judgements rendered from 1996 to 2003 (32 
judgements) and from 2004 to 2013 (39 judgements). The aim of the pilot 
study was to establish whether a change in the tribunal's language use would 
be detectable over time. The guiding hypothesis was that if a change had in 
fact occurred, it would show in a simple comparison of the early case law 
(period 1 - pre-2003) and the late case law (period 2 - post-2003). The choice 
of 2003 as the divide was based on the fact that the two time periods cover 
approximately the same number of years and judgements. The keyword 
analysis revealed a number of more or less interesting facts about the 'keyness' 
of various words in the two corpora. Among the more puzzling was the 48% 
drop in the frequency of the word if from the 1996-2003 corpus to the 2004-
2013 corpus (from 86 to 45 ifs per 100,000 words) referred to above. 
2. Explaining Corpus Linguistic Surprise: The Difference between Function Words 
and Content Words 
From the point of view of corpus linguistics, this finding was quite surprising, 
more so than, for example, a parallel finding regarding the proper noun 
Tadić,10 even though, with a 57% drop in frequency, the 'keyness' of this latter 
word was, statistically speaking, more conspicuous. The explanation of why 
we consider the relatively smaller decline in the use of ifs as 'more surprising' 
hinges on the general distinction between function words and content words. 
Function words, such as if, include determiners, pronouns, auxiliary verbs, 
prepositions, conjunctions, and particles. These are all words which, unlike 
content words (nouns, lexical verbs, adjectives, and adverbs), have little 
lexical meaning and do not refer to extralinguistic concepts. Instead, their 
function is internal to language, serving to express grammatical relationships 
between words within a sentence.11 They signal the structural relationships 
that words have to one another and are thus the 'glue' that holds sentences 
                                                 
10 Duško Tadić was the first indictee to have his case brought before the ICTY. 
11 Michael Stubbs, Words and Phrases. Corpus Studies of Lexical Semantics (Blackwell 2001), 
40, with reference to the original inventor of the distinction between content words 
and function words, Henry Sweet, A New English Grammar. Logical and Historical 
(Clarendon 1891) 22. 
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together. Unlike content words (such as proper nouns like Tadić, and nouns 
and phrases like responsibility and joint criminal enterprise), whose presence is 
strictly contingent upon the content of a text, function words are an 
omnipresent feature of all language use. 
More generally, this is also the reason why when computer-assisted text 
analysis is applied in social sciences outside of linguistics proper, some 
researchers treat function words as stop words, i.e. as residual words 
constituting a kind of 'noise' to be removed from the corpus at the 
preprocessing stage before the analysis proper.12 This is done on the 
assumption that widely present function words are unrelated to the specific 
field that the social scientist is interested in. Conversely, to the degree they 
are included, any conspicuous statistical variations in the use of such words 
are considered 'merely linguistic' and their study only of interest to linguists. 
While disregarding function words may thus be useful for some research 
purposes, it would be a mistake to do so in all contexts where one's 
Erkenntnisinteresse13 is not 'purely linguistic'. As noted above, the strength of 
corpus-driven analysis is that it allows the computer to identify striking 
linguistic patterns that would otherwise remain hidden because they do not 
fit a researcher's preconceptions or hypotheses. Our finding regarding the 
use of ifs proves this point. The significant decline in the use of this particular 
connective constitutes a finding that would have remained hidden if we had 
proceeded on the assumption that function words are only of linguistic 
interest. Yet this is also a finding that does not seem to yield itself easily to a 
purely linguistic explanation, for example by reference to grammar, the 
specific genre of judgements, or personal style of the individual drafters. 
First, the time period covered by the corpus was too short for grammatical or 
genre-specific changes to manifest themselves in this way. Second, the corpus 
is composed of texts which were to a large extent produced by language users 
whose first language is not English and who would therefore not be the most 
likely primary bearers of significant grammatical or other linguistic change. 
                                                 
12 See e.g. Christopher Lucas et al., 'Computer-Assisted Text Analysis for Comparative 
Politics' (2015) 23 Political Analysis 254. 
13 The term derives from Habermas and is usually translated with 'knowledge interest' 
or 'cognitive interest'. 
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3. On Closer Inspection: The Disappearing ifs as a Conditional Connective 
As a first step, it was therefore necessary to take a closer look at the particular 
role, or roles, which the function word if plays in the ICTY's judgements. In 
ordinary language, the most widespread use of if is as a logical connective 
expressing if…, then… conditionals.14 In general, we would expect this 
tendency to be at least the same but presumably stronger with the ifs in our 
study, since conditionals often constitute a central premise (sometimes called 
the major premise) in the syllogistic reasoning characteristic of 
argumentative texts. On closer scrutiny, therefore, it seems plausible that the 
phenomenon to be explained is, more specifically, the significant drop in the 
use of if as a conjunction introducing a conditional clause. 
Before proceeding, however, we should observe a possible source of error in 
this preliminary interpretation of the data. More specifically, it is necessary 
to control for both false positives and false negatives. On the one hand, we 
should remember that the word if is ambiguous, and that not all instances are 
conjunctions introducing a conditional clause. For instance, if is also used in 
the meaning of whether introducing questions (ask if, know if)15 and it is also 
used in certain set phrases (if any, if only, if so, and as if).16 These uses are not 
conditional and detecting variations in their frequency would therefore 
require a different kind of explanation.17 On the other hand, not all 
                                                 
14 'A conditional is a two-clause structure in which one of the clauses is introduced by if 
(possibly preceded by only, even or except) or by a word or phrase that has a meaning 
similar to if, only if (e.g. provided) or except if (viz. unless). The only two-clause 
structures that we do not treat as conditionals are those in which the subordinate 
clause is introduced by as if or is a subject or object clause introduced by if (which is 
then equivalent to whether).' Renaat Declerck and Susan Reed, Conditionals: A 
Comprehensive Empirical Analysis (Topics in English Linguistics [TiEL]) (Mouton de 
Gruyter 2001) 9. 
15 E.g. 'That day he was taken for interrogation, a statement that he had given while at 
Keraterm was read to him, and he was asked if he had anything to add.' Prosecutor v. 
Duško Tadić  a/k/a 'Dule' (Opinion and Judgement) ICTY-94-1-T (7 May 1997) para 248. 
16 E.g. '[S]oldiers on the hangar floor were behaving as if they were supporting a team at 
a football match.' Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić  a/k/a 'Dule' (Opinion and Judgement) ICTY-
94-1-T (7 May 1997) para 222. 
17 They do exhibit a decline, but their use is insignificant in terms of numbers and 
cannot account for the general decline that we have detected. According to a 
SketchEngine search if any declines from 41 to 27 per million words; if only from 5 to 
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conditionals are expressed with the conjunction if. Synonymous expressions 
include the phrases as long as, on the condition that, provided that, and unless 
(meaning if not). This means that, all else being equal, we should expect other 
conditional expressions to co-vary with the ifs. 
In general, these considerations call attention to the need to supplement 
computer-assisted corpus linguistics with in-depth manual analysis. In a 
corpus the size of ours, we therefore cannot conclusively control for all these 
factors. However, we believe we can confidently say that, by applying a 
combination of computer-assisted and manual analysis, we have controlled 
sufficiently in the present context. 
In relation to the false negatives, it seems that the occurrences of these 
synonymous expressions are quantitatively too insignificant when compared 
to if.18 Variation in their use can therefore safely be disregarded. In relation 
to the false positives, we have already mentioned that conditional use of if is 
generally the most common in ordinary language. In a well-defined corpus, it 
is in fact possible at least to further support this contention with the use of 
computers by identifying so-called collocations, i.e. 'the relationship a lexical 
item has with items that appear with greater than random probability in its 
(textual) context'.19 Using this approach, we found that among the 20 words 
with which if had the strongest collocations in the ICTY database the word 
                                                 
1 per million words; and as if from 19 to 7 per million words in the ICTY Trial Corpus 
1996-2003 compared to the ICTY Trial Corpus 2004-2013. If so stays stable over time 
(7 per million words). 
18 As long as is used 214 times, provided that 131 times, and on condition that only 13 times 
across time in trial and appeals chamber judgements of the ICTY between 1996-2015. 
In comparison, if is used 7,899 times. Unless occurs 559 times and exhibits a clearly 
declining use over time in a preliminary corpus-based study. Please note that this 
analysis is based on an extended period of time compared to the pilot study. The 
reason for this is that the control for false negatives was carried out after our corpus 
had been extended by two additional years.  
19 Michael Hoey, Patterns of Lexis in Text (Oxford University Press 1991) 7. In the 
Glossary to Sketch Engine, the notion of collocation is further described as follows: 
'A collocation, e.g. fatal error, typically consists of a node (error) and a collocate (fatal). 
Collocations can have different strength, e.g. nice house is a weak collocation because 
both nice and house can combine with lots of other words, on the other hand, the Opera 
House is a strong collocation because it is very typical for opera to occur next to house 
and, at the same time, opera does not combine with many other words.' 
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even was by far the strongest. By comparison, among the set phrases 
mentioned above only any and only made it to the top 20 (number two and 
four respectively). In other words, their connection was weaker, in particular 
since these may include only if (instead of if only), which is a conditional 
expression. Second, the set phrases (if any, if only, as if) seem to an even higher 
degree to belong to the category of function words from which it is simply 
very difficult to imagine why they should change significantly in the way 
detected. Finally, as we shall discuss below, we have observed in a subsequent, 
combined manual and computer-based study of the development of a specific 
doctrinal element (the Joint Criminal Enterprise-doctrine) across the 
ICTY's practice an even more significant drop specifically in the use of 
conditional ifs.20 This indicates that, if anything, the non-conditional ifs in 
the corpus have the effect of smoothing out rather than contributing to the 
drop in the use of ifs. On these grounds, we have found it justified to proceed 
on the assumption that the decline in ifs primarily reflects a decline in its use 
as a conditional connective. 
III. WHAT 'REALLY EXISTS IN THE JURISTIC CONSCIOUSNESS': A 
GENERIC PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 
At this point, we found it fruitful to look outside the realm of linguistics to 
explain our findings. As a first step, we decided to seek insights from the 
philosophy of law. This allowed us to see how the disappearing ifs testifies to 
the gradual emergence of international criminal law as a specialized kind of 
legal knowledge and expertise with its own silent philosophical prologue 
expressing a distinct set of tacit foundational premises. 
1. 'Do Not Make Your Contribution More Informative Than Is Required': Grice's 
Maxim of Quantity 
We were led in the direction of philosophy of law by recalling a general 
feature of language use, which provides an initial indication of why the 
frequency of if varied so strongly across the two corpora, even if function 
                                                 
20 See note 61 below. 
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words generally do not. This feature was originally identified by the English 
philosopher of language Herbert Paul Grice.21  
Grice observed that all contributions to discourse, even apparently 
monological contributions like judgements, do not merely constitute 
disconnected remarks. They are, at least to some degree, characterized by 
being cooperative efforts. When making discursive contributions each speaker 
'recognizes, at least to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or 
at least a mutually accepted direction'.22 All else being equal, discourse 
participants will therefore generally be expected to observe what Grice calls 
the cooperative principle: 'Make your conversational contribution such as is 
required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction 
of the talk exchange in which you are engaged'.23 Furthermore, Grice 
suggested spelling out this principle in a set of maxims, one of which is of 
particular importance for our purposes because it relates to the quantity of 
information in specific discourse contributions. According to this so-called 
maxim of quantity:   
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange). 2. Do not make your contribution more 
informative than is required.24 
This is important in light of the observed conditional character of the 
disappearing ifs. As noted above, if…, then… conditionals often constitute the 
central premise (sometimes called the major premise) in the syllogistic 
reasoning characteristic of argumentative texts like judgements. However, 
unlike the so-called minor premise of syllogisms, which generally provides 
concrete information or data specific to the issue at stake in any given 
argument, the major premise constitutes background knowledge of a more 
general character. Qua background knowledge, it is widely acknowledged that 
in actual argumentation the major premise is generally not explicitly spelled 
                                                 
21 See generally Herbert Paul Grice, 'Logic and Conversation' in Peter Cole and Jerry L. 
Morgan (eds), Syntax and Semantics, vol3 (New York Academic Press 1975) 41. 
22 Ibid 45. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
62 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
out if it is assumed to be shared by discourse participants.25 For instance, we 
will usually leave out the uncontroversial conditional 'if the street is wet, then 
it has been raining' and merely say 'the street is wet, therefore it has been 
raining'. Conversely, if a conditional premise is assumed to be contested, we 
will tend to spell it out. 
This variation in argumentation practice can be seen precisely as a 
manifestation of speakers' general obedience to the Gricean maxim of 
quantity. Attempting to make their arguments as informative as but not more 
informative than is required, speakers will either leave out or explicitly state the 
conditional premises of their arguments, depending on whether or not they 
assume that these conditionals constitute uncontroversial background 
knowledge shared with their audience. In other words, following Grice we 
have identified an initial indication of why our pilot study showed a 
significant drop in the use of ifs: it seems plausible that the jurisprudence of 
the ICTY generally reflects a development where certain central 
assumptions of a conditional nature are no longer considered controversial, 
but rather have become part of a shared background knowledge, and thus no 
longer need to be explicitly stated. 
2. The Generic Philosophical View of Legal Knowledge: Hans Kelsen, Joseph Raz 
and Ronald Dworkin 
In virtue of the epistemic character of these considerations, we were then 
naturally led in the direction of philosophy of law. More specifically, we 
decided to look at the tribunal's use of ifs in light of what, for present 
purposes, we have called the generic philosophical view of legal knowledge. By this 
notion, we are referring to an understanding of legal knowledge which, at the 
proper level of abstraction, can be identified across a variety of theories from 
a number of quite diverse influential legal philosophers. 
First, we shall make an approximation of this generic philosophical view 
through the works of the Austrian legal positivist Hans Kelsen. However, 
since our motivations are tied to understanding the specific phenomenon at 
                                                 
25 Cf. e.g. Stephen Toulmin uses a different terminology (where data refers to minor 
premise and warrant to major premise) but essentially makes the same point: 'data are 
appealed to explicitly, warrants implicitly.' Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument 
(2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2003) 92. 
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hand (the declining use of ifs), we shall not attempt a comprehensive exposé 
of Kelsen's philosophy but approach it in a slightly indirect and somewhat 
eclectic fashion. More precisely, we shall approach Kelsen's version of the 
generic philosophical view of legal knowledge via his follower Joseph Raz's 
discussion of one of the central and most controversial issues in Kelsen's pure 
theory of law. This is the question of what exactly Kelsen means when, for 
instance in the General Theory of Law and State, he writes that the 'ought-
statements [of the science of law] have a merely descriptive import; they, as 
it were, descriptively reproduce the 'ought' of the norms'.26  Many have 
regarded this notion of ought-statements in a descriptive sense as a particularly 
enigmatic and problematic element in Kelsen's theory. Raz, however, finds 
the notion both meaningful and rewarding, and he sets out to defend it. 
Raz suggests that the 'ought-propositions' of legal science do not generally 
tell people what they really ought to do. They are, as Raz says, statements from 
a point of view or detached normative statements. They merely state how things 
are from the legal point of view. Of the greatest importance in the present 
context, however, is a related feature of these ought-statements to which Raz 
draws attention in his further analysis. Thus, he adds that  
such statements [cannot] be interpreted as conditionals: 'If you accept this point of 
view then you should etc.' Rather they assert what is the case from the 
relevant point of view as if it is valid or on the hypothesis that it is – as Kelsen 
expresses the point – but without actually endorsing it.27 
This point is important here because it expresses a general perception of legal 
knowledge claims that has broad philosophical traction also beyond the 
specific confines of Kelsen's pure theory of law, which we therefore call the 
generic philosophical view of legal knowledge. According to this view, the 
statements of legal science all share three main features. First of all, they have, 
as already remarked, the general formal feature that they are not conditionals 
('if you accept this point of view then you should') but immediately express 
norms ('you should!'). Secondly, however, they are simultaneously tacitly 
presuppositional. By this we mean that even if individual scientific legal 
statements about valid law may not, as they stand, have a conditional 
character, they nevertheless always implicitly or tacitly presuppose the validity 
                                                 
26 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Lawbook Exchange 2009) 163. 
27 Ibid 157, emphasis added. 
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of a set of such conditional premises on the basis of which their validity is 
derived. In Kelsen's words:  
By formulating the basic norm, we do not introduce into the science of law 
any new method. We merely make explicit what all jurists, mostly unconsciously, 
assume.28  
The legal point of view therefore has a particular content that can be spelled 
out if pressed. Finally, and corresponding to the idea of one unified point of 
view, these tacit premises are not merely an arbitrary collection of atomized 
assumptions each justifying one or more mutually disconnected legal 
statements. Rather, they are philosophical or theoretical in the sense that they 
jointly constitute a comprehensive and systematic body of propositions that 
purport as a whole to provide deep justifications in a consistent and 
principled way for a whole range of first order legal statements. 
As a legal positivist, Kelsen famously holds that these implicit or tacit 
philosophical premises are constituted by a comprehensive system of positive 
legal rules. This system of rules is structured hierarchically in such a way that 
the validity of each individual legal rule can be established only derivatively 
by regression through a chain of still higher order positive norms that ends 
ultimately in one so-called 'basic norm'. The tacit (hypothetical) 
presupposition of the validity of this basic norm constitutes the unique 
starting point and premise of the entire system of valid law.29 
However, the claim that legal statements are thus philosophically 
presuppositional is a generic claim and, in the way we use it, it need not be 
tied to Kelsen's foundationalist-positivistic hypothesis. On the contrary, we 
would claim that many legal philosophers seem to hold some version of the 
generic philosophical view. We shall not attempt to demonstrate this claim 
exhaustively, but merely demonstrate its presence in the legal philosophy of 
Ronald Dworkin, who famously occupies a position at the opposite end of 
the theoretical spectrum. Thus, in spite of the profound differences between 
Dworkin and Kelsen, we find essentially the same point expressed in the 
                                                 
28 Ibid 116, emphasis added. 
29 Cf. e.g. Kelsen (n 26) 115-116 and Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory: A 
Translation of the First Edition of the Reine Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law (Clarendon 
1992) ch. V. 
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work of the former, as demonstrated by the following frequently quoted 
passage from Dworkin's Law's Empire: 
[A]ny judge's opinion is itself a piece of legal philosophy, even when the 
philosophy is hidden and the visible argument is dominated by citation and 
lists of facts. Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue 
to any decision at law.30 
As is well known, Dworkin disagrees strongly with Kelsen as to the specific 
content of this 'silent prologue to any decision at law'. In particular, he rejects 
Kelsen's assertion of a purely formal basic norm as the unique Archimedian 
point underlying the entire legal system. Instead, Dworkin maintains that the 
silent prologue consists of a more coherentist and substantively moral 
philosophical narrative constituted through a process of constructive 
interpretation that tries to show the legal system as a whole in its best light 
and to give the best philosophical justification of this practice.31 However, 
and of key importance here, Dworkin does not dispute but rather affirms the 
fact that there is a silent philosophical prologue to legal statements. In other 
words, Dworkin too subscribes to the three tenets characterizing the generic 
philosophical view of legal knowledge, as presented above. 
3. Disappearing ifs as a Sign of the Coming into Being of International Criminal Law 
as Tacit Specialized Legal Knowledge 
This is the generic philosophical view of legal knowledge, which we claim is 
helpful as a first attempt to understand the decline of ifs in the ICTY's and 
ICTR's case law. This can best be seen if we take a few steps back and remind 
ourselves of why these two international criminal tribunals constitute such 
interesting objects of study to begin with. Thus, when The ICTR Remembers 
website proudly showcases the ad hoc tribunals' role in 'producing a 
substantial body of jurisprudence on genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes as well as forms of individual and superior responsibility',32 this serves 
to remind us not merely of the imminent surplus of competent international 
criminal lawyers seeking work following the closure of the ICTY and the 
ICTR. It reminds us also of the virtual absence of any such body of 
                                                 
30 Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Hart Publishing 1998) 90. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Cf. introductory quote, n 1. 
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jurisprudence during the mid-90s, when the two tribunals first came into 
being. At that time, there was simply no commonly agreed upon 'body of 
jurisprudence' on international crimes and forms of responsibility, not to 
mention on the fundamental legality and jurisdiction of these new legal 
institutions. This means that there simply was no international criminal law 
point of view readily available for the ICTY and ICTR judges to adopt. Apart 
from the rudimentary remnants of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and 
a statute based on one Security Council resolution, the whole 'body of 
jurisprudence', and thus in effect the entire international criminal law point of 
view, had to be constructed virtually from scratch. 
In light of this historical context, and mindful of Raz's suggestion that legal 
statements from a point of view '[cannot] be interpreted as conditionals', as 
explained above, our tentative explanation for the significant decline in the 
use of ifs in the ICTY judgements was that this finding could be evidence of 
the coming into being of the international criminal law point of view. In other 
words, the decreased frequency of ifs could testify to the actual 
approximation, taking place directly among judges at the tribunals (and 
plausibly also indirectly among actors in the international criminal legal field 
more broadly), to something like the generic philosophical view of legal 
knowledge, i.e. to the notions i) that expressions of doctrinal knowledge 
specifically about international criminal law are unconditional; ii) that they are 
implicitly or tacitly presuppositional; and iii) that this presuppositionality is 
philosophical or theoretical. At the same time, however, this implies also that 
international criminal law did not conform to the generic view from the 
beginning. On the contrary, the relatively higher frequency of ifs in the early 
corpus evidences a significantly greater tendency of the ICTY toward being 
explicit about the conditionals underlying its statements about the content 
of valid international criminal law on different issues. Put differently, our 
hypothesis is that the changes in the relative use of ifs are caused by the 
coming into being in international criminal law of an epistemic community 
where the members come to share a point of view, to a certain degree, which 
renders it possible for them to make explicitly unconditional, yet tacitly 
philosophically presuppositional doctrinal normative statements from this 
point of view. 
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IV. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE TADIĆ DECISION ON JURISDICTION 
1. 'If the International Tribunal were not validly constituted…': A Challenge to the 
Foundations 
Admittedly, this may sound somewhat abstract. Perhaps we can approach a 
clearer understanding of the general role of the ifs in relation to the creation 
of the international criminal law point of view via a concrete example. This 
example is taken from the abovementioned case against Duško Tadić. We 
shall not, however, be looking at the ICTY's judgement in the Tadić case 
itself, which was part of the pre-2003 corpus in the pilot study. Instead, we 
start outside the corpus of judgements by looking at one of the tribunal's 
preliminary decisions, probably its most seminal one, namely its decision on 
the defense motion on jurisdiction.33 As we shall see, there is an advantage in 
starting outside the corpus used in the pilot study. 
Tadić was the first to be tried before an international war crimes tribunal 
created by the international community. By the time of the trial in 1995, the 
ICTY remained a hugely controversial institution in spite of having been 
established by a unanimous UN Security Council Resolution.34 It was 
therefore not completely surprising that Tadić's first legal move was to file a 
preliminary motion on jurisdiction, in the broadest sense of that word. Thus, 
Tadić challenged the tribunal's very right to try him in the first place by 
challenging the fundamental legality of the entire ICTY as an institution. 
This meant that before even contemplating making the most modest 
contribution to 'the substantial body of jurisprudence on international 
crimes and modes of responsibility', the ICTY had to justify its very existence 
and its right to try individuals. 
As is well known, the tribunal dismissed the defense motion and asserted its 
jurisdiction, thus allowing the trial against Tadić to commence.35 At its most 
basic, therefore, the conclusion of the tribunal's decision amounted to the 
                                                 
33 The Trial Chamber issued its decision on 10 August 1995. Tadić immediately 
appealed and the Appeals Chamber issued its decision on 2 October 1995. The trial 
commenced on 7 May 1996. 
34 UN Security Council Resolution 827 adopted 25 May 1993. 
35 This formulation needs qualification. Cf. immediately below on the differences 
between the Trial Chamber's and the Appeal Chamber's decisions. 
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following normative statement: 'Yes, we have the right to try Tadić'. In 
isolation, this is indeed a legal statement in Raz's sense, i.e. an unconditional 
statement made from a point of view. Crucially, however, the tribunal said 
more than that. Taken as a whole, the tribunal's decision was not silent about, 
but rather explicitly stated all the presuppositions underlying this normative 
conclusion. In this sense, the tribunal's decision perfectly constituted 
Dworkin's philosophical 'prologue to any decision at law'; it stated what 
according to Kelsen 'all jurists assume'. In philosophical terms, the decision 
constituted the conditions of possibility for any future judgement by providing 
a fully-fledged argument for the fundamental legality of the institution and its 
right to prosecute individuals.  
From the point of view of corpus linguistics, looking at both the Trial and the 
Appeals Chambers' decisions on jurisdiction, Tadić contains a very high 
frequency of ifs with 101 occurrences per 100,000 words, thus confirming the 
general picture of the early ICTY case law.36 Of particular interest here, 
however, is that several arguments in the tribunal's reasoning contained 
conditionals of the form if …, then …. This is exemplified in the following 
passage in which the Appeals Chamber recapitulates the stakes of Tadić's 
challenge: 'In sum, if the International Tribunal were not validly constituted, 
it would lack the legitimate power to decide in time or space or over any 
person or subject-matter'.37 As a whole, the reasoning thus constructed a 
                                                 
36 Tadić Case (Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction) (10 Aug 1995), and 
Tadić Case (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) (2 October 1995). 
37 Tadić Case (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) (2 October 1995), para 12, emphasis added. Other examples from the 
Appeals Chamber's decision, cf. e.g. paras 30 and 36. A few characteristic examples 
from the Trial Chamber's decision include: 
'It is a matter of logic that if the Security Council acted arbitrarily or for an ulterior 
purpose it would be acting outside the purview of the powers delegated to it in the 
Charter.' (para 15) 
'If the General Assembly has the authority to create a subsidiary judicial body, then 
surely the Security Council can create such a body in the exercise of its wide 
discretion to act under Chapter VII.' (para 35) 
'If the Security Council in its informed wisdom, acting well within its powers 
pursuant to Article 39 and 41 under Chapter VII of the Charter, creates the 
International Tribunal to share the burden of bringing perpetrators of universal 
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hierarchy of norms which, legal technicalities aside, can be reconstructed in 
the following way: i) the ICTY has the right to try Tadić (and other indictees) 
if the ICTY has primacy and the case is within subject-matter jurisdiction; ii) 
the ICTY has primacy and the case is within subject-matter jurisdiction if the 
ICTY statute is valid; iii) the ICTY statute is valid if UN Security Council 
Resolution 827 is valid; iv) Resolution 827 is valid if it is made in accordance 
with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.38 
2. From Explicit Decision to 'Silent Prologue to Any Decision at Law' 
On this reconstruction, the reasoning of the court can be depicted in the 
following way: 
 
Figure 1. Reconstruction of the ICTY's reasoning in defense of its right to try Tadić 
From this reconstruction, we observe two things. First, the reasoning of the 
ICTY in its very first decision closely resembles the philosophical 
presuppositions underlying every legal statement according to the generic 
view described above. In order to match these perfectly, the reasoning 
needed only to have been expanded slightly to include a final assumption 
regarding the validity of the UN Charter that this follows either if, following 
Kelsen, we presuppose that pacta sunt servanda, which in turn is valid if we 
                                                 
crimes to justice, the Trial Chamber can see no invasion into a State's jurisdiction 
because, as it has been rightly argued on behalf of the Prosecutor, they were never 
crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of any individual State.' (para 44) 
38 We emphasize that the actual reasoning of the court is far richer and include many 
more conditionals at each step of this norm-hierarchy. 
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presuppose the basic norm of international law that 'the States ought to 
behave as they have customarily behaved',39 or if, following Dworkin, this 
interpretation shows the system of international criminal law 'in its best 
light'.40 
Secondly, we see how, following Dworkin more closely, this philosophical 
prologue is silent (or, following Kelsen, the assumption mostly unconscious) 
precisely in virtue of being a preliminary ruling and thus deliberately not 
intended as an explicit part of the Tadić judgement or of any other future 
judgement issued by the tribunal. In fact, in the case of the Trial Chamber, 
the decision can be said to be silent also in a wider sense. Although the Trial 
Chamber also argued in favor of the legality of the creation of the tribunal, 
and did so on largely the same grounds as the Appeals Chamber, the former, 
in contrast to the latter, decided that it was not legally competent to make a 
formal ruling on the motion on jurisdiction. The Trial Chamber therefore 
emphasized that its argument for jurisdiction was only 'a comment', which it 
felt obliged to make in light of the 'importance that a body that judges the 
criminality of [human] behavior should be viewed as legitimate.' In this way, 
the Trial Chamber's argument was a silent prologue also in the wider sense 
that even when pronounced it was legally silent. 
What is crucial, however, is that unlike the generic philosophical view, the 
court manifestly did not stay silent about this 'prologue to its decision at law' 
in this very first decision; the assumption did not remain 'mostly 
unconscious'. On the contrary, before becoming 'silent'/'unconscious' it had 
to be stated explicitly. Only when this groundwork had been laid out – and 
this is particularly important with a view to understanding how logical 
connectives like if can disappear – this ceased to be necessary. Only then 
could the conditionals underlying this claim become tacit presuppositions 
and the court could henceforth simply assume – 'unconsciously' – for all 
future cases that it had the right to try indictees.41 This gives the following 
picture post-Tadić: 
                                                 
39 Kelsen (n 26) 369. 
40 Dworkin (n 30) 90. 
41 If on a rare occasion the conclusion should be challenged, it need not even restate the 
tacit presuppositions but can refer to the previous statement of them. This happened 
on a few occasions in the ICTY practice. 
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Figure 2. Reconstruction of the ICTY's point of view post- 
Tadić decision 
V. A STEADY DECLINE: FOLLOWING UP ON THE INITIAL FINDING 
1. Expanding and Refining the Analysis of ifs in Recent International Criminal Law 
This brief account of the ICTY's decision on jurisdiction in the Tadić case 
serves to illustrate the fundamental connection between 'disappearing' ifs 
and the development of a legal point of view according to the generic 
philosophical view of legal knowledge. At the same time, however, the 
example does not explain the specific finding in the pilot study, i.e. the 
conspicuous drop in use of ifs between the pre- and the post-2003 corpora. 
On the contrary, it illustrates how conditionals had already disappeared before 
the first judgement was issued by the ICTY. 
A more nuanced explanation is thus required. In terms of the generic 
philosophical view, what the decision on jurisdiction tells us is how the most 
fundamental elements of the international criminal law point of view were 
already in place before the first judgement. Therefore, the observed drop in 
the tribunal's use of ifs over time cannot strictly speaking be taken to signify 
the coming into being of that point of view. Instead, it must more accurately be 
taken as a sign of the transformation of the international criminal law point of 
view from an embryonic form and into a more mature and comprehensive 
one. Hypothetically, therefore, the observed drop in the use of ifs must be 
tied to the transformation of the silent prologue of the international criminal 
law point of view, from a point where it merely included the assertion of the 
ICTY's jurisdiction to a point, upon its closure, where it included 'a 
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substantial body of jurisprudence on genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, as well as forms of individual and superior responsibility.'  
This implies that the legal point of view has undergone consistent 
development, presumably through a more gradual process throughout the 
tribunal's existence. However, adequately tracking and documenting such a 
process requires a more refined dataset. As the next step, we therefore 
conducted a number of more targeted computerized analyses, supplementing 
these with close manual reading where computer-based analysis could no 
longer assist. 
First, it was necessary to perform a much more fine-grained analysis of ifs in 
the corpus over time. The division into a pre- and a post-2003 corpus is simply 
too crude if the aim is to establish a connection between the decrease in the 
use of ifs and the establishment in the field of international criminal law of 
something like the generic philosophical view. We therefore first had to 
make sure that the decrease could not simply be ascribed to the periodization 
that we had made, for example as a result of an anomalous overuse of if in one 
particular year. In order to exclude this possibility, we divided the entire 
corpus of the ICTY into sub-corpora, grouping judgements by year from 
1996 to 2017.  
Second, it was necessary to make sure that the detected development was not 
a matter of idiosyncrasy in the way the ICTY Trial Chamber judges used 
language. We therefore expanded the corpora so as to include judgements 
from both the ICTY's Trial and Appeals Chambers, as well as all judgements 
from the ICTY's sister tribunal, the ICTR. As noted above, the ICTR came 
into existence under relevantly similar conditions and its judgements span 
almost the same time period (1998-2015). The results of an analysis of the 
relative frequency of ifs per 100,000 words per year across these four 
chambers are shown in the figures below. 
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Figure 3. Relative frequency of ifs in ICTY Trial Chamber judgements 1996-2017 
 
 
Figure 4. Relative frequency of ifs in ICTY Appeals Chamber judgements 1997-2017 
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Figure 5. Relative frequency of ifs in ICTY Trial + Appeals Chamber judgements 
1996-2017 
 
 
Figure 6. Relative frequency of ifs in ICTR Trial Chamber judgements 1998-2012 
 
R² = 0.78570
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
ICTY Trial + Appeals Chamber, ifs per 100,000 words
Total
Linear (Total)
R² = 0.068
0
20
40
60
80
100
ICTR Trial Chamber, ifs per 100,000 words
Total
2019} What 'If'? 75 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Relative frequency of ifs in ICTR Appeals Chamber judgements 2000-2015 
 
 
Figure 8. Relative frequency of ifs in ICTR Trial + Appeals Chamber judgements 
1998-2015 
 
 
Figure 9. Relative frequency of ifs in ICTY + ICTR, all chambers judgements  
R² = 0.7736
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
20
0
0
20
0
1
20
0
2
20
0
3
20
0
4
20
0
5
20
0
6
20
0
7
20
0
8
20
0
9
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
ICTR Appeals Chamber, ifs per 100,000 words
Total
Linear (Total)
R² = 0.60370
20
40
60
80
100
120
19
98
19
99
20
0
0
20
0
1
20
0
2
20
0
3
20
0
4
20
0
5
20
0
6
20
0
7
20
0
8
20
0
9
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
ICTR Trial + Appeals Chamber, ifs per 100,000 words
Total
Linear (Total)
R² = 0.84650
20
40
60
80
100
120
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
0
0
20
0
1
20
0
2
20
0
3
20
0
4
20
0
5
20
0
6
20
0
7
20
0
8
20
0
9
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
ICTY + ICTR, all chambers, ifs per 100,000 
words
Total
Linear (Total)
76 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
Some variation notwithstanding, the general picture that emerges from these 
charts is very consistent and arguably provides further support for our 
hypothesis. As indicated by the trendlines, all the datasets exhibit a declining 
tendency in relative frequency of ifs, with values generally falling across 
chambers and tribunals from around 100 occurrences per 100,000 words in 
the earliest judgements to around 50 in the latest. The trendlines of the 
ICTY Trial and Appeals Chambers and the ICTR Appeals Chamber in 
particular show a very good fit with the data, with R-squared values of 0.8361, 
0.8465, and 0.7735 respectively.42 By comparison, the picture of the ICTR 
Trial Chamber is somewhat murkier, with an R-squared value of only 0.068, 
but still indicates a decreasing trend. Bearing in mind the vagaries and 
contingencies of language use, the general fit of the falling linear trendlines is 
arguably as good as one could possibly expect of a corpus of this size and kind. 
This is especially emphasized in figures 5 and 8, where we have added the 
values of the Trial and Appeals Chambers (0.7857 and 0.6037 respectively), 
and in figure 9, which combines the data for both chambers of both tribunals 
(0.8465). 
The overall picture that emerges from the case law is therefore remarkably 
consistent with our hypothesis and provides little support for other possible 
interpretations of the initial data. If we leave it at that, however, there is a 
danger of selecting on the dependent variable, in the sense that we have been 
looking only at corpora from tribunals whose case law coincides with the 
coming into being of the corresponding specialized legal discipline. So far, we 
do not know whether the disappearance of ifs refers to a more general 
phenomenon in legal use of language. If we are correct, this should not be the 
case. Assuming we are right that the gradual disappearance of ifs is connected 
with and provides evidence of the coming into being of a distinct 
international criminal law point of view in the sense described above, then we 
should expect not to be able to detect a similar linguistic development in the 
case law of courts which are long established and therefore make statements 
                                                 
42 R-squared value is a statistical measure of how close the collected data are to the trend 
line. R-squared values fall between 0 and 1, and, in general, the higher the R-squared 
value the closer the fit. Although a rule of thumb suggests that R-squared values above 
0.7 indicate a good fit there is strictly speaking no universal measure what is required 
for a 'good fit'. However, the measured values in this study are clearly very high, 
suggesting a very strong trend. 
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about law from already well-developed and commonly accepted points of 
view. 
2. The US Supreme Court in comparison 
It of course falls outside the scope of one study to control systematically and 
exhaustively for this possibility. However, a study of one carefully selected 
court can still be useful. Depending on the outcome, such a study can serve 
either to rule out the possibility that we are seeing a development that is 
exclusively characteristic of the field of international criminal law or, 
conversely, it can serve to rule out the possibility that what we are seeing is 
some sort of universal tendency in law. For these purposes, we have chosen to 
look closer at the case law of the US Supreme Court, which by the time the 
ad hoc tribunals were established had been issuing judgements for centuries.43 
This simultaneously provided an opportunity to look further back in time to 
the decades preceding the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR. The 
scope of the analysis was expanded to include the period between 1935 and 
2017. The results are shown in figure 10, below. 
                                                 
43 As already mentioned, we have chosen the US Supreme Court instead of, for example, 
an international court in order to avoid selecting on the dependent variable. In order 
to verify our hypothesis that the declining use of ifs is connected to the establishment 
of a specific legal point of view, a 'body of jurisprudence', we needed to control our 
findings against a court that has a very rich and long case law prehistory going far back 
before the case law of the ICTY and the ICTR. However, most international courts 
have developed most of their case law within the last two-four decades. If we are right, 
they would therefore be likely to display much the same development during that 
time. The only international court that does not fall prey to this is the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). Unfortunately, using the ICJ would leave us with a problem of 
small numbers, as the Court generally passes much shorter and much fewer 
judgements – only 129 judgements in total since 1948 compared to the 280 ICTY and 
ICTR-judgements rendered since 1996. 
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Figure 10. Relative frequency of ifs in US Supreme Court opinions 1935-2017 
The general picture that emerges from these data is clearly different. First, 
even across a time span of more than 80 years we see much more limited 
fluctuations, with the lowest frequency only 30% lower than the highest 
frequency (as compared with the 74% difference between the highest and the 
lowest frequencies across the two decades of ICTY and ICTR case law). 
Second, unlike the quite steep and steady decline in the ad hoc tribunals, the 
US Supreme Court's frequency values oscillate much less consistently, 
resulting in a very weak declining tendency, with a very low R-squared value 
(0.0335 compared with 0.8465 for the ad hocs). The general picture is one of 
random oscillations around an equilibrium, as one would expect from a court 
that has firmly established its legal point of view in the course of its more than 
200 year-long history. 
Interestingly, however, while the US Supreme Court data can thus generally 
be said to support our hypothesis, the data also show one thing that at least 
superficially seems to contradict it. Across the entire time span, the US 
Supreme Court uses ifs with a frequency that is almost twice as high as the 
highest frequency used initially by the ICTY and the ICTR. If the observed 
decline in the frequency of ifs in the ad hoc tribunals' judgements to values 
around 34 per 100,000 words is meant to indicate an approximation toward 
the generic philosophical view, then it would seem reasonable to claim that a 
roughly constant level of ifs at a much higher level would indicate the exact 
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opposite, i.e. an absence of the generic philosophical view. However, a 
preliminary study indicates that if we expand the analysis of US Supreme 
Court Opinions to cover all years from the origins of the Court, then the 
relative frequency of if over time exhibits a gradual decline just as evidenced 
in the case of the ICTY / ICTR.44 Therefore, the higher frequency of ifs in 
the Supreme Court Opinions must be explained by other factors, most likely 
by divergent genre conventions, i.e. differences between the ways in which 
US judges and the international criminal law community write judgements. 
Thus, as mentioned above, our initial formulation of the hypothesis is 
somewhat crude and in need of further refinement and nuance. We submit 
that the observation of this higher level of ifs in the US Supreme Court 
motivates a(nother) refinement of the hypothesis rather than a rejection of 
it.  
VI. FROM THE EXTERNAL POINT OF VIEW: KUHN, BOURDIEU, AND 
THE DISAPPEARING IFS 
1. The Emerging Paradigm or Doxa of the New Epistemic Community of 
International Criminal Law 
It generally seems that these data strongly support our hypothesis that the 
development in the two tribunals' use of ifs is tied to the generic 
philosophical view of legal knowledge and that they document the gradual 
coming into being and further consolidation of an increasingly 
comprehensive and rich international criminal law point of view. In this sense, 
the analysis supports what Dworkin has described as the process of law 
'working itself pure'.45 At the same time, however, the data seem to suggest 
something more, something which is not directly touched upon by the 
philosophical approach with its strong internal epistemological focus on the 
ultimate justifiability of legal knowledge. More specifically, the data seem to 
describe also the gradual emergence of an epistemic community in 
international criminal law as an empirical institutional fact. This additional 
aspect might be better comprehended if we adopt an external perspective, 
                                                 
44 We hope in a later study to be able to provide a full analysis of the ifs in the entire US 
Supreme Court case law from the beginning of its existence. 
45 Ronald Dworkin, 'Law's Ambition for Itself' (1985) 71 Virginia Law Review 173. 
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applying notions and concepts from the sociology of knowledge and science, 
as developed by Thomas Kuhn and Pierre Bourdieu. 
This additional perspective is further necessary in light of the fact that the 
theories of these two prominent sociologists do not merely address topics 
other than the philosophy of law, but also overlap and to some degree stand 
in opposition to it, presenting a challenge to the philosophical account of 
knowledge and science. It is therefore necessary to also consider the possible 
impact of our findings on this contrasting view. As we shall see, there is reason 
to believe that our findings might assist in nuancing some of the main claims 
of these influential sociological critiques of legal philosophy. 
Looking closer at the steady gradual decline in the use of conditional ifs, this 
pattern testifies to the emergence of a new field occupied by members of an 
increasingly specialized profession of international criminal lawyers who 
gradually become masters and practitioners of an emerging sub-discipline, 
sharing a body of highly specialized expert knowledge. At the same time, this 
is a process that can be said to create new disciplinary boundaries and, 
increasingly, to seal off the international criminal law point of view from those 
outside the discipline, not only laypeople but also lawyers specialized in other 
disciplines, such as national criminal law. 
In the general context of international law, the term autonomization has been 
put forward to describe the gradual development in various international 
legal fields of a body of legal knowledge marked by common references, 
concepts, and principles and by methods of interpretation and of 
adjudication specific to international courts.46 This notion can further be 
explored through key concepts developed in the sociology of knowledge and 
science, notably Pierre Bourdieu's 'doxa' and Thomas Kuhn's 'paradigm'. 
Bourdieu defines the concept of doxa as follows:  
All those who are involved in the fields, whether champions of orthodoxy or 
heterodoxy, share a tacit adherence to the same doxa which makes their 
competition possible and assigns its limits (the heretic remains a believer 
who preaches a return to purer forms of the faith). It effectively forbids 
                                                 
46 Cf. Mikael R. Madsen, 'From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: 
The European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and 
National Law and Politics' (2009) 32(1) Law and Social Inquiry 137-159. 
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questioning of the principles of belief, which would threaten the very 
existence of the field. Participants have ultimately no answer to questions 
about the reasons for their membership in the game, their visceral 
commitment to it; and the principles which may be invoked in such a case are 
merely post festum rationalizations intended to justify an unjustifiable 
investment, to themselves as much as to others.47 
This concept has been invoked, for example, by Mikael Rask Madsen in his 
analysis of autonomization in the emerging field of human rights.48 Along 
similar lines, Frédéric Mégret sees in international criminal law the 
development and consolidation of doxa across the last couple of decades as 
the possibility-condition for the emergence of this new (sub)field: 
[I]nternational criminal justice relies on a series of shared 'common places' 
about its origins and finality […]. For all the surface disagreement, part of the 
discipline's resilience can be explained by the existence of a deeply shared 
doxa […].49 
Turning to Thomas Kuhn, the notion of a 'paradigm' can be explained in 
close relation to so-called 'normal science' (the science that takes place 
between the unusual moments of scientific revolutions): 
                                                 
47 Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations (Polity Press 2000) 86. Cf. also notably Pierre 
Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge University Press 1977) and Cécile 
Deer, 'Doxa' in Michael Grenfell (ed), Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts (Cambridge 
University Press 2013) 119-130. 
48 '[The Bourdieusian] approach […] seeks an analysis of the gradual emergence of a 
more structured field of human rights on the basis of the practices of a series of agents 
and institutions, which, during different historical stages, have helped define this 
social space and its overriding logics. This becomes an analysis of the different nomos 
and illusio and eventual doxa of the field and the ways in which this influenced the logic 
of practice of the agents.' Mikael R. Madsen, 'Reflexivity and the Construction of the 
International Object: The Case of Human Rights' (2011) 5(3) International Political 
Sociology 265. Similarly, Jean D'Aspremont uses Bourdieu in his general analysis of 
international law as a belief system – although he avoids doxa and focuses instead on 
Bourdieu's closely related notion of miscognition, Jean D'Aspremont, International 
Law as a Belief System (Cambridge University Press 2017), especially ch. 1.  
49 Mégret, 'International Criminal Justice as a Juridical Field' [2016] Vol. XIII Champ 
pénal/Penal field <https://journals.openedition.org/champpenal/9284> accessed 8 
November 2018. 
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[N]ormal science can succeed in making progress only if there is a strong 
commitment by the relevant scientific community to their shared 
theoretical beliefs, values, instruments and techniques, and even 
metaphysics. This constellation of shared commitments Kuhn at one point 
calls a 'disciplinary matrix' […] although elsewhere he often uses the term 
'paradigm'.50 
Although originally developed in relation to natural science, and in particular 
to physics, this notion of paradigm has travelled far into the social sciences 
and, as in the case of Bourdieu's doxa, also into international law, where, for 
example, Mark Weston Janis has suggested using it as the 'meta-theory' of 
international law.51 David S. Koller has emphasized the role of paradigm 
specifically in relation to international criminal law.52 
In the context of the disappearing conditional ifs, it seems that our findings 
can actually provide (additional) empirical support for these claims about the 
                                                 
50 Alexander Bird, 'Thomas Kuhn' in Edward N. Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Winter 2018 Edition, forthcoming) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/thomas-kuhn/> accessed 6 
November 2018. Kuhn's paradigm theory was originally developed in his main work, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago University Press 1996 [1962]). 
51 Mark Weston Janis, 'Sources in the Meta-History of International Law: A Little 
Meta-Theory—Paradigms, Article 38, and the Sources of International Law' in 
Samantha Besson and Jean D'Aspremont (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the 
Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2018).  
52 David S. Koller, 'The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer' (2008) 40 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 1019, at 1032. Koller's use 
could be challenged in so far that Kuhn originally developed the notions of paradigm 
and normal science to explain scientific revolutions by which he understood 
transitions from pre-science to science or from one period of normal science to 
another (e.g. from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics). In the case of international 
criminal law, however, it seems that we are dealing with a paradigm and a normal 
science that came into being through specialization; a branching out from generic 
international law, or perhaps rather a merger between international humanitarian law 
(IHL), international human rights law (IHRL) as sub-disciplines of international law 
and criminal law as a sub-discipline in domestic law. However, it is commonly 
acknowledged that Kuhn's theory can also be used to understand specialization and 
in his later work, Kuhn himself focused increasingly on this phenomenon, cf. K. Brad 
Wray, Kuhn's evolutionary social epistemology (Cambridge University Press 2011), 
notably Chapter 7: Scientific Specialization. 
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existence of doxa and/or of a normal science paradigm in international 
criminal law. The steady decline in the use of ifs suggests the increasing 
confidence felt by the international criminal law actors in the beliefs 
constituting the conditions of meaningful discourse. Through the 
Bourdieusian prism, the first decades of the ad hoc tribunals' life witnessed 
the emergence of international criminal law as a new (sub)field, with the 
corresponding development and consolidation of doxa as the possibility-
condition of this field of opinion. Correspondingly, from a Kuhnean 
perspective, the decline of ifs corresponds to the transition of international 
criminal law as a discipline from pre-science to normal science and thus to the 
emergence and consolidation of an international criminal law paradigm. 
2. 'Law Was Once Introduced Without Reason, and Has Become Reasonable': The 
Charge of Irrational Relativism 
At the same time, the disappearance of ifs may also constitute an important 
challenge, or at least a corrective, to these sociological approaches, especially 
when it comes to an understanding of the epistemic micro-dynamics involved 
in the creation and consolidation of the paradigm/doxa of the emerging 
normal science/field. This point calls attention to some of the most 
contentious and debated exegetic issues in relation to the works of both 
Kuhn and Bourdieu.53 More specifically, both theorists have been accused of 
implying an irrational and ultimately untenable relativism. Before returning 
to our findings, this subsection explains this contention. 
The discussion starts from the observation that both Kuhn and Bourdieu can 
at least be read as emphasizing a sharp dichotomy between what constitutes 
a discipline's condition of possibility (i.e. the paradigm or doxa respectively) 
and what takes place on the surface and immediately presents itself as the 
discipline. On this reading, the paradigm/doxa is not only silent in the sense 
emphasized by the generic philosophical view of legal knowledge, i.e. as a 
prologue that is no longer articulated but now merely tacitly presupposed in 
any given occasion. The paradigm/doxa itself is also unapproachable through 
rational analysis. This is precisely what makes the discipline autonomous and 
                                                 
53 For some references, cf. notes 62 and 63 and below. 
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what seals it off from other disciplines and makes it categorically inaccessible 
to outsiders. 
In Kuhn's theory, this inaccessibility to outsiders is explained in relation to 
paradigm shifts in terms of the incommensurability of different paradigms:  
[T]he proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different 
worlds. […] Just because it is a transition between incommensurables, the 
transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a step at a time, 
forced by logic and neutral experience.54  
Koller emphasizes precisely this radical irrationality of the paradigm: 
Kuhn illustrated the critical role played by faith in underpinning paradigms 
such as that of international criminal law. Faith—in the sense of belief in the 
absence of a sufficient rational basis—has a natural and essential role to play 
in all human endeavors where science and reason have been exhausted, or 
have not yet become available. The fields of law and criminology are no 
exceptions.55 
Again, we should observe that in international criminal law we are dealing 
with a new paradigm created through specialization; Kuhn's considerations 
about incommensurability explicitly relate to a shift between competing 
paradigms within the same science. However, as mentioned above (cf. note 
52), it is common to extend Kuhn's considerations by analogy to the 
phenomenon of specialization, also in relation to incommensurability.56 
Although admittedly a difficult interpretive issue, Bourdieu can at least be 
read in much the same vein, i.e. as highlighting the rational inaccessibility of 
doxa. In relation to doxa, Bourdieu thus emphasizes that 'what is essential goes 
without saying because it comes without saying: the tradition is silent, not least 
                                                 
54 Kuhn (n 50) 150, emphasis added. 
55 David S. Koller, 'The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer' (2008) 40 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 1019, at 1032. 
56 Cf. Wray (n 52) 127. One might add that this follows by implication. If 
incommensurability is due to the fact that commitment to a given paradigm is 
irrational in the sense that it involves a leap of faith, then this paradigm remains 
rationally inaccessible to all outsiders of the normal science which it supports, 
regardless whether these outsiders are placed in a competing paradigm within the 
discipline, or whether they stand outside the discipline entirely. (We are grateful to 
one anonymous reviewer for pressing us on this point.) 
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about itself as a tradition'. He continues to describe doxa as 'the aggregate of 
'choices', whose subject is everyone and no one because the questions they answer 
cannot be explicitly asked', and as 'the sum total of the theses tacitly posited on 
the hither side of all inquiry'.57 Bourdieu's illustration of the relation between 
the fields of doxa and of opinion is shown in figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Relation between the field of doxa and the field of opinion according to 
Bourdieu.58 
In his late work Pascalian Meditations (2000), Bourdieu developed these 
thoughts in relation to law, building in particular on the following statement 
by Pascal: '[The people] must not see the fact of usurpation; law was once 
introduced without reason, and has become reasonable.'59 Bourdieu fully 
endorsed the anti-foundationalist, anti-Cartesian sentiments of these words: 
Thus the only possible foundation of law is to be sought in history, which, 
precisely, abolishes any kind of foundation. At the origin of law, there is 
nothing other than arbitrariness (in both senses), 'the fact of usurpation', 
violence without justification. Genesis amnesia, which arises from exposure 
to custom, masks what is spelled out in the brutal tautology: 'law is law, and 
                                                 
57 Bourdieu (n 47, 1977) 167-168, first emphasis in the original. 
58 Bourdieu (n 47, 1977) 168. 
59 Pascal (from his Pensées), quoted in Bourdieu (n 47, 2000) 80. 
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nothing more.' Anyone who wants to 'examine its motive', its raison d'être, 
and 'sound it even to its source', that is, ground it by going back to the first 
beginning, like philosophers, will never find anything other than this kind of 
principle of sufficient unreason.60 
These passages from both Kuhn and Bourdieu invite a reading not only of the 
paradigm/doxa as impenetrable to rational argument but also of the explicit 
level, i.e. the day-to-day puzzle-solving of normal science/the ortho- and 
heterodoxy displayed in the field of opinion, as constituting the sole realm of 
reason or, in Bourdieu's words, the universe of discourse or of argument. The 
paradigm/doxa is that which renders rational discourse possible but which 
itself defies any rational contestation or reconstruction. Instead, the battle 
between competing paradigms/doxas is extra-rational, involving only pious 
faith and/or raw power. 
3. Empirical Support for Armchair Philosophers? 
Following this line of reasoning, one might naturally have expected the exact 
opposite development in the ICTY's and ICTR's language use from the one 
observed. Thus, going back to the beginning of the tribunals’ existence, there 
was ex hypothesis no full-fledged paradigm/doxa of international criminal law. 
In their absence, one might have expected the early judgements to consist 
primarily of Bourdieu's 'brutal tautologies' – 'law is law, and nothing more' – 
or of Kuhnean exclamations of faith. Conversely, at the time of the tribunals' 
closure, when ex hypothesis the paradigm/doxa was more firmly in place as the 
condition of possibility of rational discourse and contestation, one might 
have expected to find more closely argued texts. 
As documented above, however, we have instead seen the opposite 
development. We have seen that the earliest texts in the corpus – where the 
fundamentals of international criminal law were not yet in place and where 
the paradigm/doxa was still being negotiated – were eminently rational, 
containing a large number of explicit conditionals and chains of arguments 
that could be reconstructed all the way down to the most fundamental level. 
And we have seen the opposite in the later development of the case law: a 
greater unwillingness to spell out all the premises of one's reasoning. 
                                                 
60 Bourdieu (n 47, 2000) 80-81. 
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This observation challenges the strong relativism often associated with Kuhn 
and Bourdieu, not least by some of their proponents in international criminal 
law. It may be true that large parts of the discourse of the 'mature tribunals', 
i.e. the ICTY and the ICTR toward the end of their existence, are heavily 
'truncated', in the sense that they do not make sense immediately as they 
stand but rather only against a backdrop (the paradigm or the doxa of 
international criminal law) which is unfamiliar to outsiders. However, 
according to our findings it simply seems empirically wrong to claim that this 
backdrop, understood as the most foundational beliefs of practitioners of 
international criminal law, should somehow reside in an extra-discursive 
universe and as such categorically escape rational reconstruction. On the 
contrary, and as exemplified most clearly in the Tadić decision on jurisdiction, 
which clearly states the foundational assumptions on which the field relies,61 
it seems that the early case law is to a very high degree accessible to outsiders, 
precisely in virtue of the high frequency of conditionals. 
It should be emphasized that this foundational reasoning of the court does 
not go all the way to the absolute axiomatic foundational level. We are not 
                                                 
61 This is of course is not to say that these foundational assumptions are argued 
flawlessly, or that they are uncontroversial. The point is only that the line of reasoning 
in the early case law is more easily accessible to outsiders than the late case law. 
This point is further corroborated by a close combined automated corpus linguistic 
and manual reading of the case law relating to one of the most controversial aspects 
of the ICTY jurisprudence, i.e. regarding the introduction of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise as a mode of responsibility. Thus, the ICTY discusses this doctrine in a 
number of judgements in response to challenges against this mode of criminal 
responsibility raised by defendants at different times throughout the ICTY's 
existence. The relevant case law falls in three periods: i) 1999; ii) 2003-2008; and iii) 
2014-2017. Interestingly, the frequency of ifs used in these three period follows the 
general pattern closely although even more clearly with the following distribution per 
100,000 words, i.e. 1999: 236 ifs; 2003-2008: 123 ifs; and 2014-2017: 54 ifs. 
Corresponding to this computer-based reading, however, the first judgements are 
immediately readable for outsiders openly embracing the controversial issue and 
arguing in general language the pros and cons of the doctrine drawing on a wide 
variety of different and non-specialized sources. This contrasts sharply with a reading 
of the case law constituting the final group which is far more impenetrable to lay 
readers with its widespread use of specialized legal language, references to the 
doctrine in abbreviated form ('JCE'), and prolonged discussions of technical matters 
of detail rather than the doctrine's fundamental raison d'être. 
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claiming that the tribunal is searching, Cartesian style, for the Archimedean 
point of all knowledge. The tribunal only goes to the point where it can 
establish a solid connection between the controversial starting assumption 
inside the emerging field (jurisdiction over Tadić and other individuals) and 
the most closely related uncontroversial assumption in the world outside 
(pacta sunt servanda). This is sufficient to overcome the strong relativistic 
claim of incommensurability between paradigms. 
In this sense, it seems, somewhat ironically, that the armchair philosophers 
referred to in the first sections of this paper do indeed seem to be closer than 
the sociologists to providing an empirically adequate understanding of the 
fundamental logic at play in the development of an epistemic community like 
the one constituted by international criminal lawyers. This by no means 
implies that it is not useful to invoke Kuhn's and Bourdieu's notions of 
paradigm or doxa to describe the autonomization and gradual emergence of a 
specialized field like international criminal law. However, in so doing, the 
temptation to infer strong relativism should be resisted. 
As discussed above, the issue of strong relativism in Kuhn's and Bourdieu's 
respective theories remains contested and has inspired extensive 
commentary and critique.62 Furthermore, both Kuhn and Bourdieu seem to 
have struggled with the question themselves, especially in their later work, in 
which they both exhibit a certain uneasiness and impatience to reassure the 
reader against the most radical interpretations.63 Whether they have 
succeeded in doing so remains an open question. However, if our 
                                                 
62 Especially Kuhn's notion of incommensurability has occasioned heated debate and 
raised deep exegetic discussions, cf. e.g. Léna Soler, H. Sankey, and Paul Hoyningen-
Huene (eds), Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison (Springer 2008) and 
Ipek Demir, 'Incommensurabilities in the Work of Thomas Kuhn' (2008) 39(1) 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 133. For a useful overview and discussion 
of Bourdieu's notion of doxa, cf. Deer (n 48).  
63 For Kuhn, see notably his 'Postscript – 1969' in Kuhn (n 50) and Thomas Kuhn with 
James Conant and John Haugeland (eds), The Road Since Structure (University of 
Chicago Press 2000). For Bourdieu, see e.g. Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J.D. Wacquant, 
An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Polity Press 1992) and especially Bourdieu (n 47, 
2000), notably 91-93, and Pierre Bourdieu, Science of Science and Reflexivity (University 
of Chicago Press 2004) which constitutes his final lecture course at Collège de 
France, and is devoted to the subject of science. 
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interpretation of the results of the corpus linguistic study of conditional ifs is 
correct, they might seem to suggest a Solomonic way out of the cul-de-sac of 
strong relativism. Incommensurability and autonomy are real phenomena, 
but the sociology of knowledge and science is most fruitful when these are 
conceptualized in relative and not absolute terms. The crucial assumptions of 
the practitioners in the field may indeed be unconscious but they are still 
assumptions; the prologue may indeed be silent, but it is still a pro-logue. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The considerations presented in this paper were prompted by the findings in 
a computer-driven corpus linguistic study of all judgements from the ICTY 
and the ICTR from 1996 to 2017. To our surprise, this study revealed that the 
frequency of the use of ifs in all judgements had exhibited a steady diachronic 
decline from 93 per 100,000 words on average in 1996 to 34 in 2017. We 
submit that the combination of the philosophical and the sociological 
perspectives applied here has brought us closer to an explanation of this 
phenomenon. This explanation ties the waning use of ifs to the gradual 
emergence over the last couple of decades of international criminal law as a 
specialized kind of legal knowledge and expertise with its own distinct set of 
tacit philosophical premises constituting the field's 'substantial body of 
jurisprudence' and embedded in a distinct epistemic community as an 
empirical institutional fact. At the same time, the empirical findings also 
necessitate a reconsideration of our preexisting general theoretical 
understanding of the emergence of disciplinary knowledge and epistemic 
communities. In this way, the corpus linguistic study of the use of ifs has 
proven useful not only for a deeper understanding of the field of international 
criminal law.  
On the assumption that international criminal law is not completely unique 
but is representative of any emerging field of specialized knowledge, it seems 
warranted further to assume that this study has the potential to contribute in 
interesting ways to the philosophy and sociology of knowledge and science. 
On these grounds, we further submit that corpus linguistic studies of the legal 
use of conditionals deserve greater attention in future research. With the 
added resources available in philosophy and sociology, we believe that the 
systematic study of frequency patterns across time in the use of conditional 
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language in various epistemic fields constitutes a promising avenue of further 
study. In the first instance, we are thinking of (and have, in ongoing work, 
already partly begun) expanding the specific corpus linguistic approach 
applied here to other courts. Not only does it seem promising to look beyond 
judgements to decisions, as well as to other international criminal courts and 
tribunals, notably to the International Criminal Court. It would also seem 
obvious to look at the case law of other international and even national 
courts.  
Furthermore, it could be interesting to expand the search for disappearing ifs 
to scholarly literature including textbooks. It is still an open question 
whether these different literary genres exhibit analogous behavior or whether 
they develop independently. Kuhn claimed that there was a significant 
difference between research literature and textbooks, and it could be 
interesting to see whether empirical findings support this claim. Regardless 
of the results, these findings would require further theorizing. 
Finally, it could also be interesting to expand the approach to other scientific 
fields. For instance, it could be interesting to carry out corpus linguistic 
studies of ifs in science journals during periods of generally agreed paradigm 
shifts (e.g. before and after Einstein). Natural science is a perhaps completely 
different ball game to international criminal law and law more generally. 
However, keeping in mind the ramifications of Kuhn's study, which 
originally dealt only with the history of physics, it could be interesting to see 
whether this corpus linguistic study of the role of conditional ifs in legal 
knowledge might have the potential conversely to enlighten our 
understanding also of other disciplines, including in the natural sciences. 
 
